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Abstract
We argue from an empirical analysis of Latin-American household surveys that per
capita income in the country of residence has a negative eﬀe c to nc h i l dl a b o rs u p p l y ,
even after controlling for other household characteristics. We then develop a theory
of the emergence of mandatory-education laws. If parents are unable to commit to
educating their children, child-labor laws can increase the welfare of altruistic parents
in an ex ante sense. The theory suggests that measures that reduce child wages can
make poor families better oﬀ, but that this may come at the expense of even poorer
families.
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Until a little more than 150 years ago, child labor was the rule among poor children in most
countries, including the US and Great Britain. Today, many countries have laws banning or
restricting child labor. The ILO convention C138 against child labor has been ratiﬁed by 89
countries, indicating opposition to child labor generally among these countries. Yet it is not
clear from the current state of economic theory why full-time education of children should
be compulsory. Indeed, given standard versions of the economic theory of the household, as
in Becker (1976) and Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), in which altruistic parents only send
their children to work when this enhances the welfare of the family, laws against child labor
can only reduce the welfare of households, particularly those so poor that children’s income
is essential for survival.1
Under standard assumptions, the simplest explanation of the above observations is that
child labor laws are not binding; they merely formalize the optimal decisions of households in
countries that have become so rich over time that even the poorest parents want to educate
their children. In Figure 1, we present the results of a regression for 54 countries for which
the UN has reported positive child-labor rates for 1998. The graph suggests that child labor
around the world is negatively related to GDP per capita. In fact, variation in GDP explains
1As today in poor countries, the children of poor parents were likely to spend little time in education and
instead work in paid employment outside the home, or in a family business, such as agriculture or a cottage
industry. Equivalently, children were also likely to devote their time to domestic work, enabling parents to
spend more time in labor outside the home. In India today, Anker and Melkas (1996) has estimated that
children’s contributions to the household often constitute as much as 25% of the household’s income, per
child.
Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) show that only after the incidence of child labor had already begun to
decline, in 1833, a time when 36.6 % of boys aged 10-14 were working, did Britain pass legislation restricting
child labor. This, as well as the observation by Goldin (1979) that higher wages for fathers in Philadelphia
in the late 19th century reduced the probability of child labor, suggest that the forces driving child labor
in poor countries today are fundamentally similar to those experienced by the US and England in the 19th
century.
268% of the variance in child-labor rates among these countries.2
This raises two questions. First, are child labor and education laws really responsible for
reducing child labor? If the answer to this question is aﬃrmative, the second question is
why such laws are enacted. Of course it is always possible to explain such laws by appealing
to externalities in the labor market, or to inter-dependent preferences, but the question is
whether there is a simple explanation, closer to standard theory, that yields empirically
falsiﬁable predictions about the emergence of restrictions on child labor?
It is not obvious how to answer the ﬁrst question, because there do not exist simple
measures of the status of child labor by country. There are several reasons for this diﬃculty.
First there are many ways in which enacted laws may restrict child labor; some laws restrict
labor directly, while others require compulsory schooling, and each approach can diﬀer along
many dimensions, such as minimum ages, maximum hours, and wage controls.3 Second,
there is often a huge gap between legal status and enforcement; in England, for instance,
laws restricting child labor were introduced in the 1820’s, but were not rigorously enforced
until the 1860’s. Third the status of child labor may vary by administrative region of the
country, or there may be conﬂicting status at diﬀerent levels of government.4 For all of these
reasons, it is not possible to construct a reliable measure from legal status alone.
In this paper, we address the ﬁrst question by proposing a simple measure of the permis-
siveness of a country towards child-labor. We ask whether the country a child lives in has
an eﬀect on the child’s labor force participation, controlling for observable household char-
acteristics such as income, family size and education of the parents. Applying this measure
to household data from Latin America, we argue that the answer to the ﬁrst question is that
yes, the country of residence does indeed have a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on children’s labor
force participation. Our measure does not distinguish between the eﬀects of child labor laws
2Based on The World Bank’s Annual Development Report 2000, which has data on children’s participation
rate (aged 10-14) for all countries. The data is for two years only: 1980 and 1998.
3See Krueger’s paper for an analysis of the choice between labor restrictions and compulsory schooling.
Basu has a child-labor based theory of the minimum wage.
4See Moehling (1999) for an analysis of variation in child-labor laws across the U.S. in the early 20th C.
3and some other country characteristic, such as culture, social norms or diﬀerences in labor
market conditions, that could result in lower child labor, but we show that this measure is
negatively correlated with whether a country has approved the ILO convention against child
labor, suggesting that the country’s government is indeed opposed to permitting child labor.
A good feature of our test is that it cuts through the complications arising from the gap
between enactment and enforcement of child labor laws. A drawback is that it may reﬂect
some other country characteristics unrelated to both household characteristics and the legal
status of child labor. In the absence of theory therefore, we cannot deﬁnitively answer the
ﬁrst question. It is easy to draw up a list of country characteristics in addition to child-
labor’s legal status that may jointly inﬂuence the decisions of all parents in the country. In
other words, having established the strength of country eﬀects on child labor, we must turn
to the second question in order to answer the ﬁrst.
Why do countries enact laws against child labor? We propose a theory based on the
assumption that parents suﬀer from a commitment problem with respect to their children’s
education/labor decision. Faced with the trade-oﬀ between education of their children and
household income from child labor, poor parents may choose less education for their child
than they would were they able to commit to an education path at the time they become
parents. If laws are chosen according to a process in which the median voter is decisive, then
our theory provides a threshold condition which poor countries must pass for child labor laws
to be enacted. This theory explicitly incorporates competing roles for income and the rate
of return to education as explanations of the country eﬀect on child labor, and implicitly
allows a role for other country characteristics that aﬀect the parent’s payoﬀ from education
of the child.
In our theory of child-labor, parents are more impatient between today and tomorrow
than they are between adjacent periods further in the future. in other words, they have
time-inconsistent ‘quasi-geometric’ preferences, of the type familiar from Laibson (1997) and
Krusell and Smith (1999). In the absence of other institutions allowing parents to commit,
child-labor laws may increase the welfare of poor households in an ex ante sense by allowing
4parents to achieve a higher level of education for their children than they would be able to
achieve with an unconstrained choice set. The assumptions of our model imply that only
when parents have wage levels in an intermediate interval will child-labor restrictions make
them better oﬀ; low-wage parents are worse oﬀ and high-wage parents are indiﬀerent. This
suggests a simple model of child-labor laws in which a country is composed of parents who
diﬀer by their education and hence skill levels. Initially, most parents are too poor to even
desire a full-time education for their child. Over time, skill levels and hence parental wages
may increase; at the moment when the parent with the median skill level enters the wage
interval deﬁned above, a majority of the adult population would favor legislation compelling
full-time education of all children, or other restrictions on child labor.
For analyzing child-labor decisions, the argument is especially appealing because the time
between making such decisions and the full beneﬁts from schooling may be quite long. For
instance 15 years will elapse between the decision whether to educate a 10-year old child
and the time when the wage of an educated worker overtakes that of an unskilled worker.
If the payoﬀ to educating children is weighted towards the end of the parent’s life, as would
be the case if children’s income is considered provision for old age of the parent, then this
makes the time scale of the education decision of the same order of magnitude as that of
the retirement-savings decision, where the time-inconsistency issue has become increasingly
prominent, as in ?.
Recent theories of child labor in the literature include Glomm (1997) and Dessy (2000),
but these models do not imply a theory of the emergence of child-labor laws. Other ap-
proaches to analyzing child labor however could also yield a theory of child-labor laws. For
instance Basu and Van (1998), rely on the hypothesis of multiple equilibria in the market
for unskilled labor to explain why in some countries banning child-labor could be welfare-
enhancing. To the extent that child labor and adult labor are substitutes, a poverty-induced
massive participation of children in the labor force may contribute to a decline in adult wages,
thus maintaining in place the forces that perpetuate poverty and child labor. It is not clear
however what the empirical implications for child labor laws would be of such an approach;
5poor countries would seem to beneﬁt equally from banning child-labor, so an explanation of
the tolerance of child labor in these countries would be required. This is also a diﬃculty for
?, who argue that child-labor laws can reduce ineﬃciency in inter-generational allocations,
but not why some countries fail to ban child labor. However in our model, such tolerance of
child labor naturally persists until median income reaches a minimum threshold level.
In the sections that follow, we ﬁrst develop our empirical measure of a country’s per-
missiveness towards child labor. In the second section, we present a general formulation
of the model of parental allocation of children’s time. In the third and fourth sections we
analyze the implications of the model for two policy issues: a reduction in child wages, and
the emergence of mandatory-education laws. The ﬁnal section summarizes our ﬁndings.
2. Child Labor in Latin America
In this section, we analyze a cross-country dataset, comprised of the results of representative
household surveys of 12 countries in Latin America, to compile an index of the permissiveness
of each country towards child labor. These indices reﬂect the extent to which the country
of residence helps to predict whether children are in the labor force, controlling for family
characteristics, such as income and education, and are measured as the country ﬁxed eﬀects
in OLS regressions with child employment measures as the dependent variables. We ﬁnd
that there are indeed signiﬁcant country eﬀects, after controlling for parental income. 5 At
the end of this section, we show how these indices relate to per capita GDP and whether
the country is a signatory to convention C-138. In addition, we show that whether a child
is in the labor force is strongly correlated with measures of education, such as whether the
5Earlier versions of these surveys have been used previously to analyze similar issues, as in Psacharopou-
los (1997), who examined the relationship between child labor and educational attainment in Bolivia and
Venezuela, and by Moe (1998), who analyzes fertility and human-capital investment in Peru. Szekely and
Hilgert (1999) use these surveys to analyse the sources of income inequality across the diﬀerent countries,
while Dahan and Gaviria (1999) analyze the relationships between social mobility and marital sorting on
the one hand, and income inequality on the other.
6child is attending school, and how many years of schooling the child is lagging behind the
maximum potential years for her age.
Child labor is inherently diﬃcult to measure; much of it is unpaid work, often for family
members around the house or the farm. It is also possible that parents suppress information
on their children’s work, and for some countries, children’s labor variables are automatically
set to zero for children younger than 12. Even though the dataset in question includes
direct measures of child labor, such as hours worked, labor income, and an indicator of the
child’s employment, it is likely that these variables understate signiﬁcantly the prevalence of
child labor. Therefore we also use indirect measures, such as whether children are attending
school, and the gap between potential and reported years of education.
For each measure Li,j of the labor of child i in country j, we estimate the following
equation on the characteristics xi of the child’s family:
Li,j = αj + βxi + εi,j
One of the most important speciﬁcation decisions is whether fertility or family size should
be included in the family characteristics. The argument for including some measure of the
number of children is that children add to the household’s desired consumption, while older
children potentially increase the family’s income, with their own labor capacity. Hence
families with more children may either be more inclined to send a working age child to work,
if the other children are younger, or less inclined, if the other children are older. However
we believe that such measures should be excluded, because fertility decisions are themselves
responses to child-labor conditions. Under standard, Beckerian fertility models, such as
Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), child labor reduces the cost of having children, and
hence increases fertility6. Therefore controlling for fertility would bias the estimate of the
country’s eﬀect on fertility, by falsely attributing to fertility part of the eﬀe c tt h a ti sd u e
to the status of child labor in the household’s country. 7 The variables that we would like
to include are those indicators that standard theory suggests are relevant for the child-labor
6See Dopeke (1999) for a model in which this interaction plays a key role in economic development.
7For a recent theoretical analysis of fertility and child labor, see Doepke (1999).
7decision, but not strongly dependent on that decision, such as parental education and family
income net of child labor.
2.1. The Data
The data set in question is a compendium of representative household surveys of 12 countries
in Latin America. The surveys are designed to be representative of the population of their
respective countries. This is a small sample, but it proved impossible to extend the analysis
to other countries because most surveys ignore labor force participation of children. Uruguay
reports labor force behavior for children over the age of 14, but was excluded because it does
not cover children under that age. The advantage of focussing on Latin America is that these
countries are quite similar in many ways; polygamy is not an accepted practice, nomadic
peoples are the exception, and European education traditions are well established.
Earlier versions of these surveys have been used individually to analyze similar issues, as in
Psacharopoulos (1997), who examined the relationship between child labor and educational
attainment in Bolivia and Venezuela, and by Moe (1998), who analyzes fertility and human-
capital investment in Peru. These surveys have also been used previously in the literature
on income inequality. Szekely and Hilgert (1999) show that these surveys indicate a wide
variation in the degree of income inequality across the diﬀerent countries, while Dahan and
Gaviria (1999) use this data to analyze social mobility and income inequality. The data
include education and labor earnings variables for all members of sample families.
The sample is restricted to single-family households with children in the age range 10-
17 that reported positive family income. The lower bound of the age range represents the
earliest age at which most countries collect child labor information, and the upper bound
the oldest age at which children are generally in secondary education. The key assumption
behind this age range is that children have signiﬁcant labor capacity, and that it is the
parents who are deciding the children’s time allocation across work and education.
Child labor is inherently diﬃcult to measure; much of it is unpaid work, often for family
members around the house or the farm. It is also possible that parents suppress information
8on their children’s work, and for some countries, children’s labor variables are automatically
set to zero for children younger than 12. Even though the dataset in question includes
direct measures of child labor, such as hours worked, labor income, and an indicator of the
child’s employment, it is likely that these variables understate signiﬁcantly the prevalence of
child labor. Therefore we also use indirect measures, such as whether children are attending
school, and the gap between potential and reported years of education.
Table 1 shows some basic descriptive statistics for the data. Income and wages have
been converted to US dollars, by equating purchasing power parity across countries to the
US. level, using measures published by the OECD. The table shows the averages for several
key variables: number of children per family, hours that employed children spend in paid
employment, the income of employed children, the age of the child, and the total income of
the family, excluding children’s earnings. These are reported by the age-group of children:
the interval 10-14 years, and the interval 15-17 years. Child labor is also reported at younger
ages in some of the surveys, such as Peru, but the number of observations by country is too
small to allow reliable statistical estimates at these ages.
2.2. Child Labor and Education
A key assumption in the paper is that child labor reduces education. Some empirical evidence
for this assumption is presented in Table 2. The table shows results for a probit regression
in which the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one for kids in school, and zero
otherwise. The explanatory variables include an employment variable, the age of the child
and family characteristics, such as household income, father’s education and number of kids
aged less than 6 years old. The employment variable is set to 1 if kids worked 10 hours
per week or more, zero otherwise. Age variables are based on deviations from the mean,
while income variables appear as deviations from the median; both appear in the regression
equation as the logs and the squares of the logs. Consider a family in which the parents
have 6 years of education each, and earn the median income. Suppose they live in a country
where the ﬁxed eﬀect = 1. The table suggests that employment reduces the probability that
9a child aged 10-13 attends school from 91% to 75% for boys and from 93% to 86% for girls.
An alternative measure of the impact of child labor on education is the education gap,
which equals the potential education of the child as a function of age, less the attained
education, measured in years. Table 3 shows OLS estimation results for a regression of
education gap on the same explanatory variables described above. The estimates suggest
that employment increases the gap by 0.38 years for boys in the younger group, and by 2.82
for girls. For the older group, the estimates are 0.767 and 0.266, respectively. These numbers
are associated with high t-values, and reinforce the impression from the previous table, that
child labor competes with education in the allocation of children’s time. While these numbers
do not seem large as a percent of average educational attainment, it is likely that children
with interrupted schooling will not return; hence a positive gap indicates that attainment
will not increase with age. This argument is explored explicitly in Psacharapoulos (1981),
who reports even larger education gaps associated with child employment in Peru.
Obviously there is no attempt here to deal with unobserved heterogeneity or with co-
linearity among the explanatory variables. If less able students were more likely to leave
school , then these estimates would represent upper limits on the eﬀect of child labor. On
the other hand, assuming that parental income does not directly aﬀect education, the bias
resulting from co-linearity between employment and family income is clearly towards under-
stating our result: children with low income do worse in school, holding ability constant,
because they are more likely to be employed. In the absence of further evidence, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the results are not driven by bias from omitted variables, and hence
we conclude that child labor does indeed have a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect on educational
attainment.
2.3. Country Eﬀects on Child Employment
To see how child-labor patterns vary across countries, we report in Table 4 results for a
regression of child labor-hours on parental income, parental education and the age of the
child, as well as a set of dummy variables for each country. The table shows that children’s
10hours are higher among the older age group of children, and that the cross-country patterns
are otherwise similar across age groups. Parental income reduces the probability of child
employment, as does education of the parents, with mother’s education having a slightly
larger eﬀect than father’s education. Hence the impression that emerges is that child labor
is a response to poverty, and parents use higher income to purchase more time in education
for their child.
The main message of the country ﬁxed-eﬀects in the table is that child labor participation
depends on the country of origin, even after controlling for parental income. The unexplained
component of children’s hours is signiﬁcantly higher in Bolivia, Brasil, Paraguay and Peru
than in the other countries. Therefore child labor is not merely a matter of parental poverty:
there is a signiﬁcant social eﬀect as well. It turns out that Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay are
the poorest countries in the sample, on a per-capita basis, while Brasil has the most unequal
distribution of income8. Hence it is likely that the common denominator across countries
with high child labor is indeed a low median income. Countries where child labor is least
likely, controlling for parental income are Argentina, Panama and Chile; hence the fact that
two of these are the most prosperous countries in the sample supports the idea that there is
an income-based explanation of the country-eﬀects on child labor.
2.4. Explaining the Country Eﬀects
We interpret the ﬁxed eﬀects estimated in Table 4 as indicators of the permissiveness of the
countries in question towards child labor. In this section we examine how these eﬀects are
correlated with per capita income and with whether a country has ratiﬁed the ILO’s C-138
convention against child labor.
Table 5 shows how these estimated ﬁxed eﬀects relate to per capita GDP. The relation
between GDP and the child labor ﬁxed eﬀect is negative, and often quite strongly so; the
estimated coeﬃcient is shown in the row labeled “log(GDP)”, and below it the standard
8See Facing up to Inequality in Latin America, 1998, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington,
D.C.
11error, the t-statistic, the probability of the t-statistic under the null hypothesis, and the
R-squared coeﬃcient. 9 The country-GDP relation is much stronger for girls in both age
groups than for boys; labor supply of girls declines more quickly with per capita GDP. It is
signiﬁcant that in all cases, the relationship is stronger for the younger age group than for
the older, which is consistent with our interpretation, as we would expect more restrictions
on child labor for the younger age group. This strong relation between GDP and the country
eﬀects suggests that an increase in GDP reduces child labor not only via higher family income
of high-risk families, but also via some aggregate eﬀect.
It is encouraging therefore to note the consistently negative correlation between these
eﬀects on the one hand, and a country’s support of convention C-138 on the other. Data on
whether a country is one of the 89 countries that have ratiﬁed this convention, which dates
to 1973, is available from the ILO web site. The convention states that “National policy
must aim to ‘ensure the eﬀective abolition of child labor’...”. 10 The consistent negative sign
of these correlations, reported in the ﬁnal two rows of Table 5, suggests that countries which
we ﬁnd more open to child labor are less likely to have oﬃcially endorsed the convention
against child labor, which is what one would expect if our indices are in fact reﬂecting the
hostility of the general legal and political climate of a country towards child labor.
Robustness is of course a major issue in this type of regression analysis, particularly with
so few data points. An important possibility is that the explanatory variable is actually
reﬂecting the eﬀect of some other variables with which it is correlated. These indicators of
child labor are essentially residuals, and hence do not distinguish between the eﬀects of child
labor laws and other factors omitted from the regression that may also inﬂuence child labor.
This issue is addressed in Table A3, which shows the eﬀect of including a second aggregate
variable in the regression of the country eﬀects on GDP per capita. The variables, whose
9Quadratic terms had very little eﬀect on R-squared, so these higher-order regressions are not reported.
10According to the ILO web site, www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/whatare/cld_paper.htm
“The States that ratify this convention must, inter alia, protect the child from economic exploitation
and from performing any work that is likely to interfere with his education, or be harmful to his health or
well-being.”
12values are given in Table A2, are the Gini coeﬃcient for income, the total fertility rate,
the percent of the country’s GDP accounted for by agriculture, and the rate of return to
education. This last variable, the Mincer coeﬃcient, is taken from Bils and Klenow (2000).
The result is that GDP remains statistically signiﬁcant for girls, while for boys the GDP
eﬀect is no longer statistically signiﬁcant when other variables are added to the regression.
This is to be expected due to the small size of the sample. However what is interesting is
that the sign of the GDP eﬀect remains negative in all cases. Furthermore, in the most
successful models, such as the girls 10-13, particularly the speciﬁcation with agriculture,
the GDP coeﬃcient is more signiﬁcant than in the single-variable regression, and R-squared
much higher.
In conclusion, it appears that GDP per capita does inhibit child labor, even after taking
into account household income. The sample is too small to allow multi-variate analysis,
but the ﬁnding appears robust to inclusion of other variables. The estimated country eﬀects
behave as one might expect for an indicator of child labor permissiveness: they are negatively
correlated with ratiﬁcation of the ILO’s anti-child labor convention, and they are stronger
for young children than for older.
3. A Model of Child Labor
The empirical analysis above suggests that there is considerable variation within Latin Amer-
ica in regards to the tendency of children to work, and it is likely that this reﬂects variations
in the legal status of child labor across countries. In this section we present a simple theory
of parental decisions regarding the allocation of children’s time between labor and education.
Under our assumptions, parents may favor child-education laws because they help parents
to commit to more education for the child. The key assumptions are: 1) child labor reduces
education, 2) parents get utility from the education of their children, 3) parental preferences
are time-inconsistent, and 4) the median voter is decisive. The main result of the model is
that parents optimally choose laws that restrict children to a minimum time spent in school.
Consider an economy where agents live for 2T +1periods, the ﬁrst T as children, and
13then T +1periods as parents, with one child born when the parent is aged T. The parent has
an endowment of human capital hp and receives labor income whp. Children may become
workers from the time that the parent is aged T +1 . Their human capital on attaining
adulthood at period T is given by hc
T, which depends on the fraction ec
t of their time they
have allocated to their education at each age. This allocation is decided by the parent. The
child’s initial human capital is hc









Parents get utility u(cτ) from their own consumption in each period τ of their own ﬁnite
lives and utility ν (hc
T) in the ﬁnal period of life from the ﬁnal level hc
T of their children’s
education. Parent’s discount factors for future utility are quasi-geometric; the discount factor
between adjacent future periods is β ∈ (0,1), but between the present and the immediate












We interpret delta as a measure of the severity of the time-inconsistency problem: as we
will see below, the lower is delta, the greater is the range of parental income over which the
parent’s inability to commit leads to a lower level of the child’s education.
Children’s labor income depends on the fraction of time (1 − ec
t) the child works in period
t, and on the child’s eﬀective wage wc
t, which is the basic child’s wage wc
1, times the child’s
productivity premium for age. The child’s wage is not a function of the child’s human
capital.11 Furthermore, following Cain (1977), it is assumed that a child aged t +1is the






t, 0 ≤ γt < 1
11This assumption is standard in the literature on child labor; see Glomm (1997); Baland and Robinson
2000; or Dessy 2000.
14all t. As the child grows older, the productivity premium for age, γt, declines, as the child’s
wage converges toward the adult wage. A direct implication is that the sequence of age-
speciﬁc productivity diﬀerentials {γt}
T
t=1 converges from above towards zero as t approaches
T.
In each period t ≤ T, parental consumption is constrained by the total household labor
income, which is equal to the sum of parental labor income and that of the child. Let pt
denotes the period-t per unit education cost reﬂecting for example, expenditures on school
supplies, registration fees, transportation costs etc. Then the parent period-t budget con-
straint is given by:




t − ptet (3.2)
This parental budget constraint implies that, in addition to the direct cost, ptet,o f
educating a child, there is also an indirect cost, in the form of household income foregone
from child labor sources wc
tec
t. The essential point, that child labor signiﬁcantly reduces both
educational time and eventual attainment, is well supported by empirical studies, such as
Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) and Psacharopoulos (1997).
In their ﬁrst period, children are physically incapable of working, so parental consumption
equals wphp. Since parents make no time-allocation decisions this period, when their child
has age t =1 , it will be ignored below, except to consider voting over labor laws.
It will be assumed below that the above functions obey the following standard conditions:
U.1 u0 > 0; u00 < 0; u0(c) →∞ as c → 0; u0(c) → 0 as c →∞ .
U.2 v0 > 0; v00 < 0; v0(h) →∞ as h → 0; v0(h) → 0 as h →∞ .
U.3 φe > 0,φh > 0,φee < 0,φhh < 0,φe,h > 0.
Assumption 3 implies that education time and previous attainment are complements in
the production of next period’s attainment. Furthermore the second-derivative assumptions
imply enough concavity that interior solutions, when they exist, are optimal.
153.1. Optimal Education Decisions
In general the choice of education at time T −j will deviate for two reasons from the choice
of a parent who can commit at t =0 . First is the direct eﬀect of impatience, i.e. the change
in discount factor between T − j and T − j +1 . Second, there may be strategic interaction
between the parent’s decisions at diﬀerent time periods. These eﬀects are illustrated below.
It is straight-forward to solve the parent’s problem by backwards induction. In the last








. Therefore when allocating
the child’s time between education and labor in the penultimate period, the parent faces the





































, subject to (3.2) and (3.1).



















. Diminishing marginal utility implies that if the optimal ec
T−1 is interior, then the child’s
education will be increasing in the parent’s human capital, h0. Furthermore, the presence of
δ on the right hand side implies that the education choice, if interior, will be strictly less
than what the parent would have chosen could he have committed to ec
T−1 at some earlier
time.
Given the above assumptions, it is important to ask whether parents whose children have
higher level of human capital carried over from the preceding period will tend to invest less
in their children at time T − 1. As shown in the following proposition, the answer to this
question depends upon whether a marginal increase in the level of human capital carried
over from the previous periods “suﬃciently” raises the marginal productivity of child’s time
allocated to education:





T−1 < 0. Furthermore, (ii) ∂eT−1/∂hp > 0, and (iii) ∂eT−1/∂δ > 0,w h e r eeT−1 =
gT−1(δ,h p,h c
T−1) denotes the interior solution to (3.3).
Pr o o f .Given the properties of the functions u, ν,a n dφ, the second order condition for











< 0. The implicit function
theorem may then be applied to establish all three results.
Condition (3.4) states that the increase in the productivity of time allocated to schooling
due to a marginal increase in the level of human capital carried over from the previous
periods is not “too” large. Part (i) of proposition 1 states that child’s time allocated to
education tends to be smaller(greater), the higher (smaller) the child’s human capital level
carried over from the previous period. Part (ii) of proposition 1 states that richer parents
tend to invest more on their children’s education. Part (iii) states that child’s time allocated
to schooling declines with the severity of the time-inconsistency problem.
To deﬁne the solutions for the preceding periods, it is convenient to analyze the parental
decision as the outcome of a 2-stage dynamic-programming problem, as in Laibson, Repetto,
and Tobacman (1998) and Krusell and Smith (1999). Using the deﬁnition of the optimal





t,g t (δ,h p,h
c
t)]. (3.5)






















































































,w h e r e(3.6) denotes the continuation value at T − 1.
From the point of view of period T −2, the discount factor between periods T −1 and T
is given by β, but the parent knows that when the time comes to choose ec
T−1, the discount
factor between periods T − 1 and T will be βδ.


























This ﬁrst order condition is satisﬁed by the education time e that equates the marginal cost
of educating the child at T −2 to the marginal (future) utility from raising the child’s human
capital level. Given that the parent will act impatiently in the future, at T −2 she perceives

















































where gT−1 ≡ gT−1(δ,h c
T−1,h p).
The second term on the right hand side is perfectly standard; the ﬁrst term however only
appears due to the time-inconsistency of the parental preferences; otherwise the envelope
theorem tells us that the term multiplying the policy function derivative would be zero at






















. However without commitment, it becomes important to investigate whether the marginal
beneﬁt of an additional increment in the child’s level of human capital carried over from the







T−1) turns out to be larger or smaller than







answer to this question is summarized by the following proposition.























Pr o o f .Since condition (3.4) hold, by proposition 1, ∂gT−1/∂hc
T−1 < 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,




























18implying that the policy gT−1(δ,h c
T−1,h p) is sub-optimal from the point of view of period
T − 2. Hence the result.
Proposition 2 states that both the direct and strategic eﬀects of time inconsistency reduce
the perceived future beneﬁts of educating the child at T −2. This in turn causes parents to
choose ineﬃcient levels of child’s schooling time in each period.
Earlier stages of the game are solved by applying the same approach. At time T −3,t h e





















































































































































































































Note that the ﬁrst two terms are negative due to strategic interaction. Therefore adding
more periods worsen the eﬀect of time -inconsistency in the sense that the future beneﬁts of
educating the child today becomes even smaller.
19T os o l v ef o rt h ec o m p l e t es e q u e n c eo fe d u c a t i o ni n v e s t m e n t si ss i m p l yam a t t e ro fc o n -
tinuing the procedure of backwards induction described here all the way back to the ﬁrst
period of the child’s life. If the conditions of proposition 2 are satisﬁed, this means that
adding more periods to the analysis will further aggravate the time-inconsistency problem
but not qualitatively change our results, so from now on we restrict attention to the simple
case T =3 .
3.2. Parametric Example
In this section we sacriﬁce some of the richness of the model in order to obtain analytical
results. We consider a simple 2-period version of the model with logarithmic preferences and
Cobb-Douglas technology. This speciﬁcation implies the strategic eﬀect is zero. What do
we lose by restricting the model in this way? Under the conditions of Proposition 2 above,
the strategic interaction eﬀect and the addition of more periods of education both intensify
the time-inconsistency problem, so in a world characterized by these conditions, the simple
version below could be considered a reduced-form version of the full model, in which the
time-inconsistency parameter δ is made smaller to reﬂect the two omitted eﬀects.
For the policy analysis to be conducted here, we need the answer to two questions: (1)
Who beneﬁts from banning child labor? and (2) How does the optimal level of compulsory
education depend on the parental state? Some analytical results are possible for a suﬃciently
simple choice of time structure and functional forms. Since the data we have on children’s
education and labor time is available only for two periods (primary and secondary education),
we restrict the analysis to education decisions over two periods of childhood.
Suppose that T =3 , so that parents choose their children’s activities for two periods.
Let u(c)=l n c and ν (h1
T)=Alnh1


























where η > 0.
20Notice that as long as e > 0, the functional form for the human capital accumulation
technology allows for children to have positive human capital even in the absence of parental
investment in schooling. We show in appendix A.1 that with respect to their optimal choice
of education policy pairs, (e∗
1,e ∗
2), parents can be classiﬁed in four groups determined by
their human capital levels. In particular, under certain conditions, all parents with human
capital levels in the range:



















































and h ≤ H1(δ) < ¯ H1(δ) < ¯ H2(δ) ≤ ¯ h. N o t et h ed e p e n d e n c eo ft h es i z eo ft h er e s p e c t i v e
ranges on the time-inconsistency parameter, δ. This implies that the distribution of the
population of parents across these ranges is aﬀected by the degree of severity of the time-
inconsistency problem. Hence the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The lower is δ, (i) the larger the number of parents who choose not to
educate their children in all periods ( i.e., parents who choose (e∗
1,e ∗
2)=( 0 ,0); and (ii) the
smaller the number of parents who choose to educate their children full-time in all periods (
i.e., parents who choose (e∗
1,e ∗
2)=( 1 ,1)).
Pr o o f .It suﬃces to note that H1(δ) (respectively ¯ H2(δ)) is higher the smaller δ (i.e.,
the more severe the time-inconsistency problem), as established in appendix A.1.
21Proposition 3 is the parametric analog of proposition 2; it establishes the potential inef-
ﬁciency of parental education policies due to the time-inconsistency problem. Note however
that since H1(δ) (respectively ¯ H2(δ)) is smaller the higher δ,a n dδ ∈ [0,1], for parents whose




, time-inconsistency is not
a problem. Parents with human capital in the interval [h,H1(1)] are just too poor to aﬀord
to give up on income from child labor sources, hence (e∗
1,e ∗
2)=( 0 ,0). In contrast, parents




are rich enough to pass on the opportunity to
supplement household income with income from child labor sources, hence (e∗
1,e ∗
2)=( 1 ,1).
While for the ﬁrst group of parents, –the poorest ones– banning child labor will result in
aw e l f a r el o s s ,f o rt h es e c o n dg r o u p ,– t h er i c h e s tp a r e n t s – t h e r ew i l lb en ow e l f a r ec h a n g e .
This raises the issue of whether there are parents who can be made better oﬀ by such a ban.
We address this issue below.
4. A Reduction in Children’s Wages
An important policy issue in many prosperous countries today is whether to restrict imports
of goods made using child labor. The professed objective of such policies would be to make
the children better oﬀ by preventing their exploitation as workers, and lower the opportunity
cost of their education. Under standard preferences, an exogenous change in the children’s
wage reduces the welfare of those parents whose children were working before the change.
In our model, it is possible that some parents are made better oﬀ by such a change. In this
section we explore conditions required for this to happen. We show that while some families
may indeed be better oﬀ, in an ex ante sense, as a result of such a policy, these families are
not necessarily the poorest ones.
From the point of view of a poor household considering how to allocate children’s time,
the eﬀect of such a policy would be perceived as a reduction in the wage for child labor.
For parents to gain from a reduction in the child’s wage, there must be in increase in their














































































s i n c ew er e s t r i c tT to equal 3.
Now consider the eﬀect, on parents’ welfare, of an exogenous change in the basic child








1. In appendix A.2
we prove the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that utility satisﬁes constant elasticity of substitution and
parental education policies are in the interior of the choice set. Then there exists a threshold













Furthermore, the more severe the time-inconsistency problem, the wider the range of parental
human capital such that all parent with human capital within this range can be made better
oﬀ by an exogenous reduction in the child labor wage.
Pr o o f .See appendix A.2
This says that some parents may indeed gain from a reduction in the children’s wage, but
that in general there may be poorer parents who will lose. Thus our model supports the idea
that sanctions on child labor may make some poor families better oﬀ, but with the risk of
hurting even poorer families, as argued above. In all cases of course, children’s education will
increase, but this is partly due to the simplifying assumption of no direct costs of children’s
education, such as tuition fees or nutrition.
It is important to note that this result does not rely on the assumption of direct costs
of education, such as tuition fees or materials; these have been included to demonstrate
23the robustness of our basic model. Obviously,such costs reduce the set of winners for two
reasons. First, by raising the cost of education, the gains to making children attend school
are reduced. Second, the wage-reduction policy, by lowering the revenue of those families
whose children acquire a partial education, will reduce the education of these children even
further. However in many countries, education, at the primary level at least, is heavily
subsidized, so our analysis can be simpliﬁed by omitting direct costs.
5. Compulsory Education
We now explore the conditions required for the emergence of compulsory-education laws.
The key assumption we make here is that laws are chosen by the median voter in an election
in which the only issue is how high to set the minimum amount of time children should
s p e n di ns c h o o l . 12 We also assume that parents who would choose full-time education for
their own children, and therefore do not directly beneﬁt from mandatory-education laws,
will also support laws requiring full-time education.
There are 3 cases, one where the minimum binds in both periods, the others where it
binds in one only. The latter cases are less interesting because they are equivalent to the
median voter making the optimal education choice ex ante. In this section, only the ﬁrst
case is considered. To focus exclusively on the determinants of the timing of the adoption of
laws restricting child labor, we set γ =0 . Therefore, where the minimum schooling binds in











(e + b e)
(1+η)(1−η)
¸¾
Note the absence of the time-inconsistency parameter, δ, on the median voter’s problem.
This is because voting acts as a commitment mechanism, in which case δ =1 .
Proposition 5. The minimum level of compulsory education is an increasing function
12To ensure that richer countries would ban child labor altogether, we would also need to assume that
parents who are suﬀﬁciently rich so as to choose zero labor for their children will either favor compulsory
schooling or abstain from voting on education laws.
24of the median voter’s income. Furthermore, unless the median voter’s income is above a
threshold f H(wp,w c), there will be no political support for compulsory education, where
f H(wp,w






Pr o o f .The ﬁrst-order condition to the above problem is:
(1 + β)wc
wphp + wc (1 − b e)
= β
2 A
e + b e
(1 + η)(1− η)=
C0
e + b e
where C0 ≡ Aβ
2 (1 + η)(1− η). The preferred choice of education law is given by:
b e =( 1+β + C0)
−1 [C0 e w(hp) − (1 + β)e] (5.2)
. That the level of compulsory education rises in the median voter’s income simply follows
from the fact that ∂ˆ e/∂hp > 0.T h et h r e s h o l df H(wp,w c) is simply solution to the equation
ˆ e =0 .
Notice that the choice of ˆ e is independent, for the reasons discussed earlier, of the time-
inconsistency parameter δ. Empirically, the implication of ∂ˆ e/∂hp > 0 is quite direct: if
countries all share the same parameter values, then compulsory education should be a linear
function of the wage ratio of the median voter. This behavior should hold over the range
for which human capital makes a diﬀerence for education laws. Countries with child-labor
restrictions will be those for which b e>0. From (3.1), this implies a condition on the median
voter:






For countries where the value of the median voter’s human capital falls below this thresh-
old, increasing median income will reduce child-labor only via household income; above this
threshold, there will be an additional eﬀect of income on child labor, via the laws governing
compulsory education. Thus the theory ﬁts with the basic empirical observation we made
earlier that the unexplained variation in children’s labor across countries is negatively cor-
related with the GDP of the country, provided that median and average GDP are strongly
correlated.
25A basic empirical test could be performed, if data on children’s wages were available,
by regressing the measures of child labor discussed in the empirical section of this paper on
median income and the ratio of children’s wages to those of unskilled adults. Such a test
would raise two issues: equilibrium wage determination and parametric diﬀerences across
countries. If the demand for child labor were suﬃciently inelastic, then countries with high
equilibrium wage ratios could be those where child labor is less prevalent. Since child labor
is relatively unskilled by assumption, such conditions are unlikely. Parametric variations are
more likely to be an issue. Variations across country in the quality of available education,
for instance, aﬀects the parental decision via the return to education, here represented by
the parameter η, which is the share of school time in the human capital of the child. Another
important dimension along which countries may vary is the degree to which elderly parents
receive utility from their children’s education. The wage-skill premium would be one source
of such variation, but perhaps equally important is variation in the dependence of parents on
support from children in old age. Thus our theory of child labor laws is empirically veriﬁable,
but we leave this for future research.
6. Conclusion
This paper asked how laws against child labor might emerge despite the lack of motivation
for such laws in standard household decision theory. Our motivation for asking this question
is that while standard theory does not seem to explain why households would vote for such
laws, these laws are often credited with a signiﬁcant role in reducing child labor, as in
Doepke (1999) and Moehling (1999). We presented an empirical analysis of child labor in
Latin America that supports the hypothesis that the country of residence has an eﬀect on
the propensity of children to work, and showed that this eﬀect is more strongly negative
in countries with higher levels of per capita income. The data suggest that these country
eﬀects are not explained by cross-country variations in the return to education, not by other
plausible candidates, such as the share of agriculture in GDP or the fraction of the population
living in urban areas.
26Although the empirical analysis was limited by the small number of countries in the
dataset used here, our ﬁndings were robust to the inclusion of other variables. We interpreted
this country eﬀect on child labor as consistent with the eﬀects of variations in child labor
laws, noting a small but consistent correlation between our measure of the country eﬀect
and whether the country had oﬃcially endorsed the ILO’s conventions C-138 against child
labor.
We then presented a theory of child-labor based on the assumption that parents have
time-inconsistent preferences and showed how, in the absence of other institutions allowing
parents to commit, child-labor laws may increase the welfare of poor households in an ex
ante sense by allowing parents to achieve a higher level of education for their children than
they would be able to achieve with an unconstrained choice set. Our model does not require
parents somehow to be able to commit to laws; a lag between the vote and the enforcement
of the laws is all that is required. We showed that child labor laws emerge when the median
voter has income in an intermediate interval that depends on the returns to the parent of the
child’s education. While the median voter is in this range, an increase in per-capita income
will reduce child-labor supply of a given household, even after controlling for household
income.
Another theoretical implication of the model is that measures that reduce the wage of
children, such as a ban by foreigners on the import of goods made by child labor, will
reduce the welfare of households who are suﬃciently poor, but raise that of households that
are somewhat richer. Thus a restriction on child-produced imports by wealthy countries, a
policy that is often motivated as a way to help child workers, may indeed have the desired
eﬀect, but at the expense of children who were even worse oﬀ. Thus to assess such a policy
it is necessary to know how the distribution of poor households is divided between these two
categories.
From the point of view of assessing the long—run beneﬁts of policies restricting child
labor, an obvious next step for the model developed here would be nesting it into a dynamic
model of the income distribution, such as that of Galor and Zeira (1993). Analysis along such
27macroeconomic lines would allow us to relate the issues raised here to long term deveopment,
as in Doepke (1999), who incorporates fertility decisions into a growth model where parents
choose whether to educate their children. Thus we can see the current paper as a building
block towards assessing the eﬀects of policies to reduce child labor in developing countries.
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30Appendix A.1
In this appendix, we solve for the parental education policies e1 and e2. Once again,
the analysis proceeds by backwards induction from the ﬁnal period. In the last period, the
parent simply enjoys his child’s human capital, so that V 0
3 = ν (hc
3). Terminal human capital
hc










The following technical assumption will prove necessary to derive the analytical results.
U.4 e >A β(1 − η).
Suppose that the parent chooses in each period the time spent in education. The parental
p r o b l e mi nt h e2 n dp e r i o di s :
V (h
c
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if H2(δ) <h p < ¯ H2(δ)








































Note that since by assumption U.4, e.>A β(1 − η) and δ ∈ (0,1), it is guaranteed that
H2(α,δ) and ¯ H2(α,δ) are strictly positive.
For any program and any state, we can deﬁne the value of the program from the point












The value, from the point of view of the ﬁrst period, of entering the second period with
state (hc
2) is given by the value of W2, evaluated at the program chosen by the 2nd-period





























Now consider the eﬀect on the continuation value, W2 (ec∗
2 ,h c
2,h p), of a marginal change
in hc
2, and denote this eﬀect as ∂W2 (ec∗
2 ,h c
2,h p)/∂hc

































2,h p). Since the second period education policy is independent
of hc
2,t h e r e f o r e∂ec∗
2 /∂hc











The above remarks will prove useful for solving the ﬁrst-period problem.
32Each period-one parent chooses the education investment program given the program
chosen by the 2nd-period parent. We can write this as:
V (h
c
1,h p)=m a x
ec
1
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H1(δ) <h p < ¯ H1(δ)








































It suﬃces to prove the following claims:









[(1 + d1 + e)p1 − βηep2]
#
(.10)
Then, (i) unless a child attended school full-time in the ﬁrst period, he will not attend
school at all in the second period; (ii) at least some of the children who attended school
full-time in period 1 will be pulled out of school sometime in the second period.
Pr o o f . Note that when condition (.10) holds, ¯ H1(δ)=H2(δ). The parameters
A,β,e,η,p 1,p 2 can always be chosen such that this condition is satisﬁed. The results then
simply follow from the fact that H1(δ) < ¯ H1(δ)=H2(δ) < ¯ H2(δ), whenever assumption U.4
hold.
Lemma 1 is consistent with the empirical observation that labor force participation is
higher among secondary education, than primary education aged-children. In our model, this
result obtains when the age-premium in wage is suﬃciently high in the sense of condition
(.10).
Lemma 2. ∂Hj(δ)/∂δ < 0 and ∂ ¯ Hj(δ)/∂δ < 0 for all j =1 ,2.
Pr o o f .The result simply follows from the fact that ∂dj(δ)/∂δ > 0 for all j =1 ,2.
Appendix A.2
In this appendix, we provide the proof for proposition 4.














































































34Consider the eﬀect, on parents’ welfare, of an exogenous change in the basic child labor
change, wc













































































>From the ﬁrst order condition for e∗




































































any exogenous device that causes a decline in the basic child labor wage,w c
1, will have a
negative eﬀect on the welfare of all parents whose choice of education policies satisﬁes e∗
j ∈
(0,1) for j =1 ,2. In other words, whether there are parents who beneﬁt from an exogenous
reduction in the basic child labor wage necessarily depends on whether condition (.12) is
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2 = wphp +( 1+γ)w
c





For any parent whose choice of education policies satisﬁes e∗
j ∈ (0,1) for j =1 ,2,i ti s
clear that a necessary condition for him/her to experience a welfare gain from an exogenous
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. Therefore condition (.16) combined with (.17) implies that
β (1 + γ)
2 [(1 + γ)wc
1 + p2][u0 (c∗
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< 0, by the second
order conditions for a maximum. To determine whether there are parents who beneﬁtf r o m







denotes the consumption-elasticity, at the point cj (j =1 ,2), of the parental periodic
marginal utility u0(cj). Then condition (.18) becomes
−β (1 + γ)













1 + p1)+δ(1 − e∗
1)]u0 (c∗




To prove proposition 4, it suﬃces to prove the following two claims: (i) there exists a range
of parental human capital such that all parents with human capital within this range can be
made better oﬀ by an exogenous reduction in the child labor wage; (ii) this range is wider
the more severe the time inconsistency problem. We begin with the ﬁrst claim.
Lemma 3. Suppose ∀cj,
²u/c (cj)=¯ ². (.19)















where e h(δ) is solution to
β (1 + γ)









with ¯ δ =( 1− δ)(wc
1 + p1)+δ.

















β (1 + γ)
2 (wphp − p2)u0[wphp +( 1+γ)wc
1]
¯ ²[(1 + γ)wc
1 + p2]
h
¯ δu0 (wphp − p1)+βδ(1 + γ)u0 (wphp − p2)
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Now (.21) implies that
1
¯ ²
−β (1 + γ)
2 [(1 + γ)wc
1 + p2][c∗
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Denotes the left-hand side of (.23) as LHS.T h e ns i n c e∀e∗
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1],
it can be veriﬁed that
LHS >
β (1 + γ)









since f0 > 0 and hp > e h(δ). A contradiction. Hence the result. EndProof
Condition (.19) implies that the utility function is of the constant elasticity of substitution
form. Note that depending upon the function u, equation (.20) can have one or multiple
solutions. Therefore proposition 2 states that there exists at least one interval for hp such
that all parents with levels of human capital within that interval beneﬁt from an exogenous
reduction in the child labor wage, wc
1.




,w h e r e1 <h< h ≤ +∞. Thus, in order for the
interval spanned by e h(δ) to be non-empty, it must be that h ≤ e h(δ) < h.G i v e n wp,w c
1,
38p1,p 2,β,a n dδ, the function u, and the parameters γ, ¯ ², h,a n dh c a na l w a y sb ec h o s e ns u c h
that this interval is non-empty. The key issue however is how large or narrow is this interval,
and how is its width aﬀected by changes in the degree of severity of the time-inconsistency
of parental preferences. Recall that the degree of severity of the time-inconsistency problem
is inversely related to the parameter δ. In other words, the lower δ t h em o r es e v e r et h e
time-inconsistency problem.
To address this issue, recall equation (.20). This equation can be rearranged as follows
G(hp;δ)=0
where
G(hp;δ) ≡ β (1 + γ)
2 (wphp − p2)u








0 (wphp − p1)+βδ(1 + γ)u
0 (wphp − p2)
i
¯ ²
Since e h(δ) solves G(hp;δ)=0 , to the extent that Gh(hp;δ) 6=0 , the implicit function












wp¯ h − p2
, (.24)
and suppose
u0 (wphp − p2)
u0 (wphp − p1)
>
wc
1 + p1 − 1
β (1 + γ)
. (.25)
Then the more severe the time-inconsistency problem, the larger the interval for
parental human capital within which a parent beneﬁts from an exogenous reduction
in the child labor.
39Pr o o f .Is u ﬃces to show that ∂e h0 (δ)/∂δ > 0.B y u s i n g t h e d e ﬁnition of ¯ ²,i tc a nb e
shown that
















00 (wphp − p1)+βδ(1 + γ)u
00 (wphp − p2)
i
which is necessarily positive, due to condition (.24). Furthermore,




1 + p1 − 1)u
0 (wphp − p1) − β (1 + γ)u
0 (wphp − p2)]
which is negative by condition (.25). Hence the results. EndProof
Note that condition (.24) can easily obtain for an appropriate choice of h, ¯ h, γ,a n dp2.
It simply states that the elasticity of substitution is not too high. Condition (.25) is purely
technical and can also easily obtain for an appropriate choice of the function u and the unit
cost p1 and p2.
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dTable 1(a): Children's Characteristics
Attends Years of Education
School Education Gap
mean 0.98 4.90 0.59
std. 0.12 2.55 2.03
mean 0.83 8.97 0.51
std. 0.38 1.90 2.07
mean 0.95 4.22 1.22
std. 0.21 1.68 1.46
mean 0.81 7.45 1.97
std. 0.40 2.41 2.27
mean 0.94 3.07 2.45
std. 0.24 1.75 1.61
mean 0.79 5.49 3.92
std. 0.41 2.58 2.55
mean 0.99 4.44 1.03
std. 0.11 1.48 1.04
mean 0.86 7.95 1.49
std. 0.35 1.86 1.65
mean 0.92 4.12 1.38
std. 0.28 1.84 1.65
mean 0.75 6.98 2.49
std. 0.43 2.46 2.40
mean 0.92 4.09 1.31
std. 0.27 1.51 1.20
mean 0.61 6.78 2.65
std. 0.49 2.03 2.05
mean 0.96 5.14 0.37
std. 0.20 1.63 1.28
mean 0.83 8.30 1.16
std. 0.38 2.05 1.96
mean 0.92 4.74 0.73
std. 0.27 1.67 1.40
mean 0.59 7.57 1.87
std. 0.49 2.55 2.53
mean 0.96 4.75 0.71
std. 0.19 1.61 1.27
mean 0.76 7.84 1.61
std. 0.43 2.14 2.08
mean 0.94 4.18 1.29
std. 0.24 1.60 1.34
mean 0.68 7.08 2.28
std. 0.47 2.13 2.09
mean 0.97 4.71 0.75
std. 0.18 1.56 1.39
mean 0.81 7.83 1.63
std. 0.39 2.08 1.93
mean 0.97 4.89 0.60
std. 0.18 2.06 1.85
mean 0.77 7.75 1.72
std. 0.42 3.01 2.95
* Refers to sample of kids working 10 hours or more per week.













































































StatisticTable 1 (b): Children in Employment
Employment Child's  Child's
Rate of Kids* Hours* Wage*
mean 0.003 20.56 1.92
std. 0.052 2.28 4.06
mean 0.055 38.43 1.88
std. 0.228 0.83 1.74
mean 0.127 30.67 0.61
std. 0.333 1.95 0.92
mean 0.256 44.89 0.78
std. 0.436 1.16 0.87
mean 0.102 31.89 0.66
std. 0.303 0.70 0.90
mean 0.310 42.19 0.92
std. 0.462 0.35 0.98
mean 0.003 22.91 1.05
std. 0.057 2.38 1.59
mean 0.062 38.14 1.39
std. 0.241 0.93 1.65
mean 0.031 33.98 0.98
std. 0.173 1.13 1.52
mean 0.171 41.29 1.32
std. 0.376 0.58 1.25
mean 0.030 33.06 1.23
std. 0.171 1.72 1.55
mean 0.227 43.77 1.73
std. 0.419 0.85 0.93
mean 0.038 38.17 0.48
std. 0.190 1.98 0.70
mean 0.153 44.82 0.72
std. 0.361 1.12 0.79
mean 0.051 37.66 0.52
std. 0.219 1.32 0.51
mean 0.274 46.39 0.76
std. 0.446 0.62 0.60
mean 0.005 24.46 0.60
std. 0.067 4.63 1.26
mean 0.062 36.73 0.79
std. 0.240 1.88 0.84
mean 0.065 33.92 1.07
std. 0.247 1.75 0.81
mean 0.171 44.66 1.57
std. 0.377 1.41 1.04
mean 0.175 23.87 0.43
std. 0.380 2.60 0.54
mean 0.303 39.19 0.79
std. 0.460 1.46 0.64
mean 0.018 34.09 1.03
std. 0.133 1.64 0.63
mean 0.134 40.60 1.33
std. 0.341 0.77 0.94
* Refers to sample of kids working 10 hours or more per week.Hours and wages are median, age-adjusted .





































EcuadorTable 2: Probit Estimates for School Attendance Model
coef std coef std coef std coef std
Age of Kid -0.142 (0.000) -0.180 (0.001) -0.201 (0.001) -0.211 (0.001)
Age Squared -0.068 (0.000) -0.047 (0.000) -0.013 (0.001) -0.028 (0.001)
LogFamInc 0.102 (0.001) 0.166 (0.001) 0.129 (0.001) 0.156 (0.001)
LogFamInc2 0.014 (0.000) 0.018 (0.000) 0.010 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000)
Log(Dad's Educ) 0.098 (0.002) 0.112 (0.002) -0.172 (0.002) -0.052 (0.002)
Log(DadEduc) Squared 0.059 (0.001) 0.056 (0.001) 0.191 (0.001) 0.149 (0.001)
Log(Mom's Educ) 0.124 (0.002) 0.140 (0.002) -0.096 (0.002) 0.018 (0.002)
Log(Mom's Educ) Squared 0.074 (0.001) 0.077 (0.001) 0.154 (0.001) 0.132 (0.001)
Child Employed > 10hrs -0.826 (0.001) -0.593 (0.002) -1.086 (0.001) -0.731 (0.001)
Argentina 0.934 (0.003) 1.028 (0.003) -0.219 (0.002) -0.282 (0.003)
Bolivia 1.641 (0.004) 1.408 (0.003) 0.988 (0.003) 0.701 (0.004)
Brasil 1.372 (0.002) 1.279 (0.002) 0.842 (0.002) 0.635 (0.002)
Chile 1.478 (0.004) 1.322 (0.004) 0.379 (0.002) 0.222 (0.003)
Colombia 0.981 (0.002) 0.908 (0.002) 0.497 (0.002) 0.291 (0.002)
Costa Rica 0.541 (0.003) 0.347 (0.003) -0.044 (0.003) -0.402 (0.003)
Ecuador 1.047 (0.004) 1.028 (0.004) 0.389 (0.003) 0.261 (0.004)
Mexico 1.139 (0.003) 0.647 (0.002) 0.097 (0.002) -0.426 (0.002)
Panama 0.953 (0.004) 1.007 (0.004) -0.039 (0.004) 0.046 (0.004)
Paraguay 1.248 (0.004) 0.952 (0.004) 0.428 (0.004) 0.099 (0.004)
Peru 1.704 (0.005) 1.361 (0.005) 0.837 (0.004) 0.295 (0.004)
Venezuela 1.153 (0.003) 0.085 (0.002) 0.109 (0.003) 1.242 (0.003)
*SOURCE: Author's calculations from household surveys.
Variable Boys
Age 10-13 Age 14-17
Girls Boys GirlsTable 3: OLS Estimation of Education Gap
Estimate Std. Error t-Value Estimate Std. Error t-Value Estimate Std. Error t-Value Estimate Std. Error t-Value
Age of Kid 0.166 (0.006) 26.000 0.130 (0.006) 21.090 0.442 (0.016) 27.620 0.370 (0.016) 22.830
Age Squared -0.017 (0.005) -3.380 -0.008 (0.005) -1.740 0.004 (0.028) 0.140 0.006 (0.027) 0.220
LogFamInc -0.235 (0.010) -23.400 -0.226 (0.010) -22.840 -0.360 (0.016) -22.590 -0.353 (0.016) -21.710
LogFamInc2 -0.004 (0.004) -0.990 -0.002 (0.004) -0.440 -0.001 (0.007) -0.140 0.041 (0.007) 5.570
Log(Dad's Educ) -0.783 (0.035) -22.600 -0.742 (0.033) -22.200 -1.005 (0.054) -18.470 -1.076 (0.056) -19.190
Log(DadEduc) Squared 0.140 (0.013) 10.730 0.133 (0.013) 10.460 0.140 (0.021) 6.780 0.165 (0.021) 7.910
Log(Mom's Educ) -0.601 (0.035) -17.000 -0.711 (0.034) -20.670 -0.824 (0.056) -14.690 -0.973 (0.057) -16.960
Log(Mom's Educ) Squared 0.047 (0.014) 3.400 0.100 (0.013) 7.430 0.051 (0.022) 2.330 0.103 (0.022) 4.670
Child Employed > 10hrs 0.380 (0.027) 14.140 0.282 (0.037) 7.700 0.767 (0.032) 24.080 0.266 (0.040) 6.700
Argentina 2.488 (0.039) 63.380 2.283 (0.038) 60.480 3.954 (0.065) 60.980 3.960 (0.064) 61.600
Bolivia 2.584 (0.047) 55.390 2.531 (0.046) 55.350 3.583 (0.082) 43.670 3.774 (0.082) 46.300
Brasil 4.090 (0.028) 145.730 3.671 (0.026) 140.430 5.982 (0.049) 123.240 5.437 (0.047) 115.000
Chile 3.053 (0.042) 73.340 2.866 (0.040) 70.810 4.403 (0.062) 71.530 4.263 (0.061) 69.920
Colombia 3.269 (0.039) 83.960 2.925 (0.037) 78.450 4.916 (0.059) 83.930 4.562 (0.058) 78.050
Costa Rica 3.205 (0.059) 54.400 3.110 (0.057) 54.620 5.194 (0.082) 63.250 5.106 (0.083) 61.520
Ecuador 2.369 (0.050) 47.450 2.227 (0.049) 45.380 3.864 (0.082) 47.130 3.790 (0.084) 45.310
Mexico 2.299 (0.043) 53.720 2.224 (0.040) 55.080 3.748 (0.063) 59.310 3.891 (0.062) 62.420
Panama 2.742 (0.053) 52.020 2.447 (0.052) 47.030 4.485 (0.091) 49.030 3.953 (0.094) 42.070
Paraguay 3.090 (0.060) 51.900 2.835 (0.058) 48.780 4.485 (0.114) 39.360 4.381 (0.112) 39.220
Peru 2.356 (0.061) 38.650 2.311 (0.058) 39.670 3.651 (0.106) 34.310 3.722 (0.101) 36.670
Venezuela 2.686 (0.040) 66.470 2.229 (0.038) 58.330 4.602 (0.068) 67.650 4.004 (0.067) 59.500
*SOURCE: Author's calculations from household surveys.
Girls 14-17 Variable Boys 10-13 Girls 10-13 Boys 14-17Table 4: OLS Estimation of Children's Work Hours*
Estimate Std. Error t-Value Estimate Std. Error t-Value Estimate Std. Error t-Value Estimate Std. Error t-Value
Age of Kid 1.273 (0.043) 29.290 0.583 (0.030) 19.340 3.041 (0.147) 20.730 1.554 (0.118) 13.160
Age Squared 0.228 (0.033) 6.830 0.066 (0.023) 2.830 -0.405 (0.254) -1.600 0.062 (0.200) 0.310
LogFamInc -0.877 (0.069) -12.790 -0.361 (0.048) -7.470 -0.587 (0.147) -3.990 -0.066 (0.119) -0.560
LogFamInc2 0.232 (0.030) 7.730 0.128 (0.018) 6.980 0.186 (0.061) 3.030 0.209 (0.054) 3.910
Log(Dad's Educ) -2.819 (0.237) -11.890 -0.435 (0.164) -2.660 -1.800 (0.501) -3.590 -0.274 (0.410) -0.670
Log(DadEduc) Squared 0.394 (0.089) 4.410 -0.004 (0.062) -0.060 -0.843 (0.190) -4.430 -0.487 (0.153) -3.180
Log(Mom's Educ) -1.408 (0.243) -5.810 -1.309 (0.168) -7.780 -2.201 (0.517) -4.260 -1.428 (0.419) -3.410
Log(Mom's Educ) Squared 0.045 (0.094) 0.470 0.217 (0.066) 3.300 -0.724 (0.202) -3.590 -0.234 (0.162) -1.450
Argentina 6.955 (0.267) 26.080 2.728 (0.184) 14.800 19.800 (0.582) 33.990 8.834 (0.466) 18.970
Bolivia 7.826 (0.317) 24.690 4.726 (0.222) 21.280 22.170 (0.740) 29.950 13.008 (0.587) 22.160
Brasil 9.119 (0.185) 49.230 3.869 (0.126) 30.660 27.893 (0.401) 69.570 13.320 (0.332) 40.120
Chile 5.635 (0.284) 19.840 2.130 (0.198) 10.760 18.621 (0.553) 33.670 7.835 (0.442) 17.720
Colombia 7.455 (0.264) 28.190 2.237 (0.182) 12.270 22.644 (0.517) 43.780 7.565 (0.424) 17.860
Costa Rica 8.880 (0.402) 22.080 2.874 (0.279) 10.310 27.724 (0.734) 37.760 9.564 (0.603) 15.850
Ecuador 7.729 (0.340) 22.710 3.037 (0.240) 12.650 22.994 (0.740) 31.070 8.733 (0.608) 14.350
Mexico 9.370 (0.290) 32.350 3.544 (0.197) 17.980 26.294 (0.556) 47.320 12.214 (0.448) 27.260
Panama 5.816 (0.361) 16.130 2.316 (0.255) 9.090 17.038 (0.836) 20.380 7.695 (0.685) 11.230
Paraguay 10.830 (0.404) 26.790 3.907 (0.284) 13.760 30.762 (1.028) 29.920 13.165 (0.812) 16.210
Peru 10.003 (0.414) 24.170 6.087 (0.283) 21.520 24.145 (0.965) 25.030 14.254 (0.733) 19.440
Venezuela 7.865 (0.272) 28.900 2.225 (0.186) 11.940 23.869 (0.598) 39.920 7.501 (0.485) 15.470
Girls 14-17 Variable Boys 10-13 Girls 10-13 Boys 14-17Table 5: Correlation of Child-labor fixed effects with GDP and C-138 Ratification
C-138
log(GDP) StdErr tValue Prob(t-val) R-squared Correlation
Boys -1.963 1.016 -1.930 0.082 0.272 -0.385
Girls -1.962 0.651 -3.010 0.013 0.476 -0.273
Boys -3.743 2.800 -1.340 0.211 0.152 -0.268
Girls -3.958 1.550 -2.550 0.029 0.395 -0.319
*Source: Author's calculations based on  ILOlex Web page and Table 3
10-12 yrs
12-14 yrs
Results of OLS Estimation Age SexTable A1: Child Lab or Force Participation rates and Real GDP
Country RGDPC Child Labor Country RGDPC Child Labor
Algeria 1097 1 Mauritius 3688 23
Argentina 9070 4 Mexico 4265 6
Bangladesh 286 29 Morocco 1246 4
Botswana 3209 16 Mozambique 94 33
Brasil 4930 15 Myanmar 274 24
Burkina Faso 160 48 Namibia 2046 20
Burundi 126 49 Nepal 217 44
Cambodia 159 24 Nicaragua 431 13
Chad 149 38 Niger 191 45
China  745 10 Nigeria 1376 25
Colombia 2384 6 Pakistan 466 17
Congo 702 29 Panama 3159 3
Costa Rica 2540 5 Paraguay 1961 7
Côte d'Ivoire 731 20 Peru 2674 2
Dominican Republic 1841 15 Philippines 1151 7
Ecuador 1648 5 Portugal 10269 2
Egypt 1168 10 Rwanda 170 42
El Salvador 1935 15 Senegal 519 30
Ethiopia 104 42 Sierra Leone 260 15
Guatemala 1691 15 Sri Lanka 826 2
Guinea 535 33 Thailand 2576 15
Haiti 398 24 Togo 327 28
Honduras 785 8 Ukraine 973 22
India 402 13 Uruguay 6026 2
Indonesia 1055 9 Venezuela 3678 1
Iran (Islamic Rep. 2466 4 Viet Nam 330 8
Kenya 356 40 Yemen 318 20
Malaysia 4665 3 Zimbabwe 802 28
SOURCE: UN Human Development Report, 2000Table A2: Aggregate Variables for Country Regression Analysis
Argentina 10300 47.0 7.0 2.6 0.107
Bolivia 2880 58.8 16.0 4.4 0.073
Brasil 6480 59.1 8.0 2.3 0.154
Chile 12730 56.4 7.0 2.4 0.121
Colombia 6810 56.7 11.0 2.8 0.145
Costa Rica 6650 45.9 15.0 2.8 0.105
Ecuador 4940 56.0 12.0 3.1 0.098
Mexico 8370 52.8 5.0 2.8 0.141
Panama 7168 57.6 8.0 2.6 0.126
Paraguay 3980 62.0 23.0 4.2 0.103
Peru 4680 50.5 7.0 3.0 0.085
Venezuela 9200 49.6 4.0 3.0 0.084
Source: GDP from World development CD(2000); Mincer coefficient from Bils and 
Klenow (1997); other variables from UNDP CD (2000).
Country GDP per 
capita Income Gini
Agriculture 




coefficientTable A3: Robustness check for correlations of child labor fixed effects
Variable Estimate StdErr tValue Prob(t-val)R-squared
GINI -7.184 (9.500) -0.760 0.469
logGDP -2.347 (1.156) -2.030 0.073
AGRIPCT 0.026 (0.114) 0.230 0.824
logGDP -1.728 (1.484) -1.160 0.274
TOTFERT -0.054 (1.170) -0.050 0.965
logGDP -2.031 (1.818) -1.120 0.293
MINCER 9.243 (19.180) 0.480 0.641
logGDP -2.214 (1.179) -1.880 0.093
GINI -5.772 (5.974) -0.970 0.359
logGDP -2.270 (0.727) -3.120 0.012
AGRIPCT -0.110 (0.063) -1.740 0.115
logGDP -2.959 (0.824) -3.590 0.006
TOTFERT -0.566 (0.726) -0.780 0.455
logGDP -2.673 (1.128) -2.370 0.042
MINCER -3.609 (12.387) -0.290 0.777
logGDP -1.864 (0.761) -2.450 0.037
GINI -8.172 (26.854) -0.300 0.768
logGDP -4.179 (3.267) -1.280 0.233
AGRIPCT 0.298 (0.299) 1.000 0.344
logGDP -1.047 (3.889) -0.270 0.794
TOTFERT 0.206 (3.224) 0.060 0.950
logGDP -3.484 (5.009) -0.700 0.504
MINCER 43.206 (51.544) 0.840 0.424
logGDP -4.915 (3.168) -1.550 0.155
GINI -1.443 (14.934) -0.100 0.925
logGDP -4.035 (1.817) -2.220 0.054
AGRIPCT -0.113 (0.170) -0.670 0.522
logGDP -4.983 (2.215) -2.250 0.051
TOTFERT -0.796 (1.765) -0.450 0.663
logGDP -4.958 (2.743) -1.810 0.104
MINCER 19.807 (28.881) 0.690 0.510
logGDP -4.496 (1.775) -2.530 0.032












Results of OLS Estimation
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